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INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
RANDY E. BARNETT*

In recent years, it has become apparent that there is a differ‐
ence between (a) discovering the semantic meaning of the
words in the text of the Constitution, and (b) putting that
meaning into effect by applying it in particular cases and con‐
troversies. To capture this difference, following the lead of po‐
litical science professor Keith Whittington, legal scholars are
increasingly distinguishing between the activities of “interpre‐
tation” and “construction.”1 Although the Supreme Court un‐
avoidably engages in both activities, it is useful to keep these
categories separate. For one thing, if originalism is a theory of
interpretation, then it may be of limited utility in formulating a
theory of construction, other than in requiring that original
meaning not be disregarded or undermined.
In this Essay, I want to elaborate and defend the importance of
distinguishing interpretation from construction for the benefit of
those who may not be entirely familiar with the distinction be‐
tween these two activities. Although I begin by offering definitions
of interpretation and construction, the labels are not important.
Both activities could be called “interpretation”—for example,
something like “semantic interpretation” and “applicative inter‐
pretation.” Still, the terms “interpretation” and “construction” are
of ancient vintage and, although not always precisely defined in
this way, were traditionally used to distinguish between these
two different activities in which courts and other constitutional
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law
Center. These remarks were prepared for the Twenty‐Ninth Annual Federalist
Society National Student Symposium, held at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Permission to reprint or distribute this Essay for classroom use is hereby
granted.
1. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEAN‐
ING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07‐24, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–120 (2005); JACK BALKIN, FAITH
AND FRAMEWORK: HOW WE BUILT OUR CONSTITUTION (forthcoming).
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actors routinely engage when dealing with authoritative writings,
be they contracts, statutes, or the Constitution.
With this caveat in mind, let us now examine the difference
between interpretation and construction. Both interpretation
and construction are activities. Interpretation is the activity of
identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use of lan‐
guage in context. Construction is the activity of applying that
meaning to particular factual circumstances. Originalists may
disagree about many things, but they should all agree on the
meaningfulness of this distinction. Without it, originalists are
very likely to talk past each other, or their critics, and to con‐
fuse themselves and others.
What defines originalism as a method of constitutional inter‐
pretation is the belief that (a) the semantic meaning of the writ‐
ten Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment, and that
(b) this meaning should be followed by constitutional actors
until it is properly changed by a written amendment.2 The
original meaning of the text provides the law that governs
those who govern us; and those who are bound by the Consti‐
tution, whether judges or legislators, may not properly change
its meaning without going through the amendment process.
It cannot be overstressed that the activity of determining se‐
mantic meaning at the time of enactment required by the first
proposition is empirical, not normative.3 Although we can
choose to use words however we wish, as Alice discovered in
Wonderland, the social or interpersonal linguistic meaning of
words is an empirical fact beyond the will or control of any
given speaker (which was the point being made by Alice in
Wonderland’s author). Although the objective meaning of words
sometimes evolves, words have an objective social meaning at
any given time that is independent of our opinions of that
meaning, and this meaning can typically be discovered by em‐
pirical investigation. Conducting such an investigation is no
more a normative activity to reach conclusions we like than is
discovering what is considered good manners in a given soci‐
ety. Say “please” and “thank you”? Shake hands? Bow to
someone of higher social status? Wear a veil? We can approve

2. Cf. Solum, supra note 1 (distinguishing between the (1) the fixation thesis, (2)
the clause meaning thesis, (3) the contribution thesis, and (4) the fidelity thesis).
3. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 6.
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or disapprove of such social practices, and decide whether or
not to follow them, but their status as norms is a fact.
So too is linguistic usage or semantic meaning. Although I
am free to say, “trumetric lyperboly,” I cannot expect that any‐
one but me has access to what these two words mean. As an
empirical matter, this phrase simply has no objective meaning
in our community of discourse. By the same token, I can make
up my own meaning for “automobile” as a time machine, but if
I decide to use the word to communicate my thoughts in an
English sentence, others will take me to be referring to a car.
Where the semantic meaning of the text provides enough in‐
formation to resolve a particular issue about constitutionality, ap‐
plying it will require little, if any, supplementation, and
construction will look indistinguishable in practice from interpre‐
tation. That each state is entitled to two Senators requires little
construction to apply. But however much information is con‐
tained in the text of the Constitution, there is not always enough
information to resolve a particular issue without something more.
To see why this is so, we must understand how language can
be either ambiguous or vague. Ambiguity refers to words that
have more than one sense or meaning. Vagueness refers to the
penumbra or borderline of a word’s meaning, where it may be
unclear whether a certain object is included within it or not.
Contracts scholar Allan Farnsworth offered this explanation of
these two distinct problems of ascertaining linguistic meaning:
Ambiguity, properly defined, is an entirely distinct concept
from that of vagueness. A word that may or may not be ap‐
plicable to marginal objects is vague. But a word may also
have two entirely different connotations so that it may be
applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly ap‐
propriate and inappropriate, as the word “light” may be
when applied to dark feathers. Such a word is ambiguous.4

In other words, language is ambiguous when it has more than
one sense; it is vague when its meaning admits of borderline cases
that cannot definitively be ruled in or out of its meaning.
When it comes to resolving ambiguity, the context of a state‐
ment usually reveals which sense is meant. For example, the
term “arms” in the Second Amendment could be referring to
4. E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953
(1967).
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weapons or the limbs to which our hands are attached. Context
reveals it to refer to weapons. But even when context reveals
the intended sense of a potentially ambiguous word, there is
still a problem of vagueness. For example, just how much must
an object weigh before we cease calling it light and call it
heavy? How tall must a person be before he is no longer short?
The problem of ambiguity can usually, though not always, be
resolved by originalist interpretive method. Even when we are
not entirely certain which of the multiple senses of a word or
phrase is the intended meaning, historical evidence almost al‐
ways establishes one meaning as more probable than the oth‐
ers.5 Of course, special problems of potentially irresolvable
ambiguity can arise either when the evidence of meaning is lost
or nonexistent, or when the drafters deliberately injected ambi‐
guity into the text by using euphemisms—as they did when re‐
ferring to slavery, a clear word they fastidiously avoided
including in the text.6 Exceptions aside, evidence of original
public meaning generally resolves questions of ambiguity.
In contrast, with vague provisions, the terms themselves—
even when interpreted contextually—simply do not contain the
information necessary to decide matters of application. What is
a “reasonable” search? For that matter, what exactly is a
“search”? Is the thermal imaging of a house to detect increased
heat caused by marijuana growing in the basement a search?7
Because even vague terms have paradigmatic applications lying
clearly within the core of their semantic meaning and clearly
outside their penumbra, they are not wholly indeterminate. In‐
stead, they are underdeterminate.8 Clear cases of items that are
light or heavy, of actions that are a search or not a search, exist.
Although most words are potentially vague, we do not face a
problem of vagueness until a word needs to be applied to an
5. See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption about Constitutional As‐
sumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 634 (2009).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (referring
to slaves as “other Persons”); id. at § 9, cl. 1 (referring to slaves as “such Persons”
and “each Person”); id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (referring to slaves as “Person[s] held to
Service of Labour”).
7. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that thermal imaging
a house from a public vantage point is a search under the Fourth Amendment).
8. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (distinguishing between indeterminacy and underde‐
terminacy).
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object that may or may not fall within its penumbra. When this
happens we must engage in construction. Are restrictions on
sound trucks on residential streets an “infringement” on the
freedom of speech?9 It seems that they could be because some‐
one is being stopped from speaking. Is the requirement of ob‐
taining a parade permit before demonstrating in the public
streets an infringement of the freedom of assembly?10
The original meaning of the text does not definitively answer
these and many other similar and important questions. Instead,
courts handle these questions by the judicially devised doctrines
governing “time, place, and manner” regulations of speech,
press, and assembly.11 These doctrines are constitutional con‐
structions that are nowhere in the text, but are nevertheless a
good way to put into effect what the text does say.
This is not to say that, when the information provided by in‐
terpretation has run out, all decision rules have run out. We
could adopt a decision rule that, where a term is vague, it is
given its narrowest meaning. Or, in constitutional cases, we
could say that, whenever the text is vague, legislatures have a
free choice in borderline cases and cannot be second‐guessed
by judges. But such decision rules are rules of construction, not
rules of interpretation. They are rules that apply when the in‐
formation conveyed by the text itself is insufficient to decide an
issue, but the issue still must somehow be decided. They are
not found in the semantic content of the written Constitution.
According to the distinction between interpretation and con‐
struction, then, originalism is a method of constitutional inter‐
pretation that identifies the meaning of the text as its public
meaning at the time of its enactment. The text of the Constitu‐
tion may say a lot, but it does not say everything one needs to
know to resolve all possible cases and controversies. Original‐
ism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs
out. This is not a bug; it is a feature. Were a constitution too
specific, its original meaning probably would become outdated
9. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (holding that restrictions on
sound trucks did not violate the First Amendment).
10. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (holding
that an ordinance requiring different fees for different types of demonstrations
violated the First Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); U.S. Postal Serv. V. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
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very quickly. A constitution with a degree of vagueness dele‐
gates some decisions of application to the judgment of future
actors, provided these decisions do not conflict with the infor‐
mation that is provided by the text.
Originalists will not all agree about how to engage in consti‐
tutional construction. Part of this disagreement will stem from
their differing normative reasons for favoring originalist interpre‐
tation. Originalists who ground their commitment to originalism
in notions of popular sovereignty can be expected to favor princi‐
ples of construction that reflect this normative commitment.
Likewise, those who favor originalism as a means to protect the
background rights retained by the people will likely favor rules
of construction that are rights protective. Unless there is some‐
thing in the text that favors one construction over the other, it is
not originalism that is doing the work when one selects a the‐
ory of construction to employ when original meaning runs out,
but one’s underlying normative commitments.
So, just as originalists need a normative theory to explain
why we today should adhere to the original meaning of the
Constitution, they also need a normative theory for how to con‐
strue a constitution when its meaning runs out. There is no es‐
caping this. If you think the courts should defer to the legislature
when a particular clause is vague, you need a normative argu‐
ment for this principle of construction. The same goes for adopt‐
ing a “presumption of liberty” that places the burden on the
government to justify its restrictions on liberty as necessary and
proper. This too is a constitutional construction.12
Of course, nonoriginalists face all the same questions when
they assert that we should follow the contemporary meaning of
the text, or Supreme Court decisions that supersede the text.13
To the extent they are offering a method of interpretation, they
are making empirical claims about the semantic meaning of the
text of the Constitution today, or the semantic meaning of what
the Supreme Court has said in its opinions. They then need a
normative reason for following this meaning and employing it
to decide constitutional controversies, or disregarding the se‐
mantic meaning in favor of some other.

12. See BARNETT, supra note 1.
13 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending a
common‐law theory of “living” constitutional law).
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Should nonoriginalists claim, however, that all interpretation
is a matter of normative choice, they are actually spurning the
information embedded in the text in favor of meanings wholly
supplied or constructed by the purported interpreter. For such
nonoriginalists, everything is construction. For them, there is no
empirical “there” there.
With this as background let me now turn to what John
McGinnis and Mike Rappaport have called “original methods
originalism.”14 There is much in their approach with which I
agree. First, we agree that the meaning of constitutional lan‐
guage should be ascertained by interpretive methods in exis‐
tence at the time the language was enacted.15 Second, we agree
that most cases of ambiguity can be resolved in this way.16 But
we disagree about the problem of vague language.
Whereas McGinnis and Rappaport treat ambiguity and vague‐
ness together as essentially the same problem, to be decided by
the weight of the evidence,17 I consider these to be two distin‐
guishable linguistic problems. With ambiguity, historical context
usually allows us to identify which of multiple competing senses
of a term is its most likely public meaning. With vagueness,
however, semantic meaning truly does run out after all genu‐
inely interpretive methods are exhausted. More historical evi‐
dence will not tell you whether the thermal imaging of a house
is or is not a search. Of course, when originalist methodology is
properly applied, some supposedly vague provisions in the text
are often much less vague than they are made out to be. But re‐
sidual vagueness inevitably remains and is only concealed by
treating rules of construction—such as, “defer to the legislature in
cases of vagueness”—as though they are rules of interpretation.
Perhaps there is a distinctively “originalist” theory of construc‐
tion by which we follow what the founding generation would have
done when confronted with problems of applying vague language
to particular cases. Unlike ascertaining original semantic mean‐
ing, however, ascertaining “what the framers would have done”
is a counterfactual, not a factual or historical inquiry.
14. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
751, 751 (2009).
15. See id. at 773.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 774 passim.
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Indeed, this shows that, when engaged in such a thought ex‐
periment about “framers’ intent,” one is no longer engaged in
empirical inquiry. Because thermal imaging did not exist at the
time of the founding, there is no historical fact of the matter to
be discovered. All we can do is speculate about something that
never happened. Therefore, one is no longer engaged in inter‐
pretation, strictly speaking.
If construction is inevitable because the information con‐
tained in the text runs out before we have enough information
resolve a case or controversy, then originalists need to debate
not only the appropriate approach to constitutional interpreta‐
tion but also the appropriate approach to construction. Some
may wish to avoid this normative discussion, but cases still
need to be decided. Others will smuggle their normative prefer‐
ences into their constitutional analysis by adopting some princi‐
ples of construction over others without fully defending their
choices or acknowledging that some defense is necessary. Or
they may assume or imply that these principles of construction
are required by originalism itself.
Originalists only confuse themselves and their audience, how‐
ever, if they try to make more of originalist constitutional inter‐
pretation than the text will bear by collapsing the distinction
between interpretation and construction—two necessary and
intertwined, but nonetheless different, activities.

